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European 
Perspective of 
2-Person Rule for 
Biosafety Level 4 
Laboratories
To the Editor: Recently, the di-
rectors of Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) 
laboratories in the United States pub-
lished their views of the requirement 
of having ≥2 persons present at all 
times while biological work is under-
taken in a BSL-4 laboratory (1). They 
concluded that safety and security 
would be better assured in some situ-
ations by video monitoring systems 
rather than by the presence of a fellow 
scientist. As members of the European 
Network of Biosafety Level-4 labo-
ratories (Euronet-P4) who have de-
veloped guidelines in this area (2–4), 
we discussed the article during a re-
cent network meeting. Biosafety and 
biosecurity are the major concerns 
for all involved in BSL-4 activities, 
and we support the authors’ initiative 
and broadly agree with their posi-
tion. The consensus among European 
BSL-4 experts is that, in the interest of 
safety, standard practice should be for 
all laboratories to perform a risk as-
sessment before any activity is under-
taken. This preliminary assessment is 
the best way to determine procedures 
to be used, including whether 2 per-
sons should work together as part of 
laboratory procedure. A 2-person rule 
is inappropriate simply because the 
best approach is not to have inﬂ  exible 
rules that are not objectively assessed 
according to laboratory-speciﬁ  c  cir-
cumstances.
Surveillance video monitoring 
and data storing have their place in 
protecting laboratory facilities from 
unauthorized access and theft of ma-
terials, but their effectiveness for en-
suring proper handling of pathogens 
is quite limited. Finally, we agree with 
the authors that both biosafety and 
biosecurity must be founded on care-
ful selection and monitoring of staff, 
without which even the most sophisti-
cated of control systems would fail.
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Multidrug-Resistant 
Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis Strain 
from Equatorial 
Guinea Detected 
in Spain
To the Editor: Eleven years of 
molecular epidemiologic data allowed 
the Spanish Multidrug-resistant Tu-
berculosis (MDR TB) Surveillance 
Network to identify a speciﬁ  c MDR 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis strain 
that had been imported into Spain 
from Equatorial Guinea (1). Our study 
brings to light the potential dissemi-
nation of this strain (named MDR-
TBEG) in Equatorial Guinea, a coun-
try where little is known about the 
extent and features of TB or MDR TB. 
It also highlights that MDR strains 
can spread across continents, and thus 
MDR TB’s emergence in any country 
becomes a global problem.
Ten MDR M. tuberculosis isolates 
obtained from 10 patients from Equa-
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